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Abstract. In this paper we propose a new verifier-based password authentication protocol us-
ing Dynamic Passwords. The protocol features mutual authentication, integrated session key
exchange and is resistant to both dictionary attacks and replay attacks. It also reveals any suc-
cessful spoofing. The protocol achieves these features by using one-way hash functions, symmetric
encryption and two-part Dynamic Passwords. Dynamic Passwords break user passwords into two
parts: a dynamic part and a static part. The dynamic part is similar to a one-time password,
which can reveal to a legitimate user if any spoofing has occurred and makes the protocol more
resistant to social engineering. The static part adds entropy to the password and makes the
password more resistant to dictionary attacks. Due to the fact that verifiers are not plain-text
equivalent to passwords and from which no meaningful information about passwords can be ex-
tracted, verifiers in contrast to passwords are stored in authentication servers. The protocol is
most suitable for mobile users because no persistent data is stored on the user side.
Keywords: Integrated Key Exchange, Dynamic Passwords, Kerberos, Dictionary Attack,
Replay Attack, Revealing Spoofing.
1 Introduction
Among the many authentication protocols available, password systems are the most common
and easiest forms of authentication. Other forms of authentication may make use of something
that a user owns or is part of the user. In many cases, dedicated hardware may be required.
An authentication protocol that requires dedicated hardware is less flexible, and may have
compatibility and portability problems when implemented across different platforms. Using
passwords, users only have to remember their own account name and password in order to
access protected resources. Password authentication is easy to use and straight forward to
implement. However it has some limitations.
Strong passwords are comparatively long. Memorizing a long password made up of unre-
lated characters and digits can be a daunting task. This encourages people to choose short
passwords that are easy to guess such as birthdays, names of kin or common English words,
and to use the passwords for as long as possible. These weak passwords are the targets of dic-
tionary attack, which is a form of brute force attack. In a dictionary attack, possible passwords
from lists of common dates, names and dictionary words are used. The results are validated
using some publicly known information about the password and the authentication protocol
used.
A second problem is the replay attack. Replay attack occurs when an adversary captures
a legitimate login packet and replays it later to gain access to resources as a legal user.
2Another problem is spoofing. If a password is stolen, an adversary can login as the owner
of the password. The owner of the stolen password is not alerted to the illegal login.
With all these problems in mind, we propose the use of Dynamic Passwords. A Dynamic
Password consists of two parts. The first part changes each time when the Dynamic Password
is used and is called the dynamic part. The second part has a relatively longer life time and
length than the first part and is called the static part. If a Dynamic Password is changed
with every use, replay attack is not possible. At the same time, spoofing attack can easily be
detected.
To deliver the new dynamic part of a Dynamic Password, we propose Integrated Key Ex-
change Using Dynamic Passwords (IKE) 1. This protocol is portable for mobile users, resists
replay and dictionary attacks, provides mutual authentication and integrates key exchange
with authentication. IKE also offers a detection mechanism when spoofing happens
In this paper, we will introduce the Dynamic Password in Section 2 and a description of
Integrated Key Exchange starts in Section 3. We will discuss the possible application of IKE
in Section 5.
2 Dynamic Password
Length, composition and life time [7] are three important password design factors. A password
can be made stronger by increasing its length, decreasing its lifetime and enlarging the char-
acter set from which characters are drawn to form the password. Off-line dictionary attacks
are possible if the authentication messages contain publicly known information that can be
used to validate a password guess. If no such information is available, adversaries can still
launch on-line brute force attacks.
In [7], there is a guideline for determining the length and lifetime of passwords that are
safe against on-line brute force attacks. Assuming a password guess consists of sending 200
bits and using a modem with speed of 230.4 kbps, a password of 5 characters drawn from a
62-character set can have a lifetime of one second only. A password of 8 characters long can
have a lifetime of one day as shown in Table 1. Memorizing a long password consisting of
unrelated characters is not easy, and is not practical when the password changes frequently.
Users more readily accept longer passwords when the passwords have a longer lifetime.
Dynamic Password breaks a normal password into two parts. The Static Part (SP ) has a
longer lifetime and also a longer length. The Dynamic Part (DP ) has a shorter lifetime and
shorter length. SP and DP together satisfy the length and lifetime requirements of a strong
password. A longer lifetime alleviates the effect of the longer length of SP . The short lifetime
of DP is mitigated by its relatively shorter length.
A practical implementation is to use dictionary words as the character set of SP . It makes
SP , and in turn Dynamic Password more user-friendly. If we only use words of 4, 5 or 6 letters,
[[4-6]letter word], the character set for SP consists of approximately 23,300 characters. A SP
of length 2 means the SP is made up of two 4, 5 or 6 letter words. Again assuming a password
guess consists of sending 200 bits and using a modem with speed of 230.4 kbps, Table 1 lists
1 As pointed out by a reviewer, the name Integrated Key Exchange has been used by IPV6. We might select
a different in the future.
3the combination of lengths of SP and DP for different lifetimes. The last column gives the
length of ordinary passwords with the same lifetime. The character set used in the table for
DP is [A-Za-z0-9].
Table 1. Lengths of SP and DP for different lifetimes.
Lifetime Length of SP + Length of DP Normal Password
1 day 2 + 3 8
1 day 3 + 1 8
1 month 2 + 4 9
1 month 3 + 2 9
1 year 2 + 5 10
1 year 3 + 2 10
With every new DP , a new Dynamic Password is formed even though SP remains the
same. If the DP is assigned a lifetime until next login, the Dynamic Password formed is
effectively a one-time password [3].
If we assume users login every day, a one-time Dynamic Password will have a lifetime
of 1 day. From Table 1 a normal password with a lifetime of 1 day is 8 characters long. In
comparison, a Dynamic Password of lifetime 1 day has a DP of 1 character long and SP
of three dictionary words. As the SP can remain the same for an extended period of time,
users can remember the static SP after a few login sessions. The daily task of memorizing
8 unrelated digits and alphabets is reduced to memorizing 1 only. Both SP and DP can be
lengthened to enhance the strength of Dynamic Passwords formed.
Replay attack is not possible with Dynamic Passwords. As the DP of a Dynamic Password
will be changed with every use of the password, a replay of login request will definitely fail.
One-time Dynamic Passwords can also reveal spoofing. If an adversary impersonates a
legitimate user and gains access to an account, DP will be changed for the next login. Legit-
imate users are alerted if spoofing has occurred since they cannot login using the correct but
expired DP .
Both SP and DP when used alone are weak passwords. When SP and DP are used
together as a Dynamic Password, they form a stronger password that is easy to remember.
In the discussion below, DP and SP have character sets of [A-Za-z0-9] and [[4-6]letter
word] respectively. The transmission of the new DP and establishment of session keys will be
discussed in Section 3.
3 Integrated Key Exchange Using Dynamic Passwords
When we use Dynamic Passwords we need a protocol that authenticates a user and transmits
the new DP of a Dynamic Password after each login. We will take a look at the existing key
exchange schemes in Sections 3.1 to 3.2 and present Integrated Key Exchange Using Dynamic
Passwords (IKE) in Section 3.3.
43.1 Encryption Key Exchange
The classic protocol Encryption Key Exchange (EKE ) by Bellovin and Merritt [1] and its
successor Augmented-EKE (A−EKE ) [2] initiated a collection of authentication protocols
that apply encryption for key exchanges. EKE uses a shared secret indirectly to authenticate
servers and users.
In EKE the shared secret is the password. When Alice authenticates herself to Bob, a
session key R between Alice and Bob is also established. EKE is secure against dictionary
attacks as the contents of the messages are generated randomly. It does not provide any clue
for guessing the password. However EKE is susceptible to the Denning-Sacco attack [8] in
which a stolen session key can be used to launch a replay attack on the password. A method
to strengthen EKE against Denning-Sacco Attacks was proposed. A more efficient Minimal
EKE (M−EKE) was also proposed [8].
During EKEmessage exchanges, passwords are not sent across the communication chan-
nel, but are used as a symmetric encryption key. Both parties must have access to the shared
password. If the server is compromised and passwords are stolen, an adversary can imperson-
ate a legitimate user. In view of this, Augmented Encryption Key Exchange (A−EKE ) was
proposed to fix this problem. In A−EKE , a one-way hash value of the password is used as
the shared secret. The symmetric encryption key is the one-way hashed value of the password
instead of the password itself. However, a stolen session key can be used to launch a dictionary
attack on the password in A−EKE .
Other alternatives to A−EKE are proposed. Strong Password-Only Authenticated Key
Exchange (SPEKE) [4] uses the hash of the password as the base for exponentiation instead
of a fixed primitive base. Extended Password Key Exchange Protocols [5] are a family of
protocols that extend the A−EKE and SPEKE protocols to B−EKE and B−SPEKE by
using a second Diffie-Hellman exchange instead of a digital signature to prove that a user has
the knowledge of a certain password.
Open Key Exchange (OKE) [6] eliminates the use of encryption for the user’s public key.
Another feature of OKE is that the user’s public key can be reused as long as the private key
is kept secret.
3.2 Asymmetric Key Exchange
Based on the swapped-secret approach, Asymmetric Key Exchange (AKE) [9] is another
class of protocol that exchanges keys without using encryption. Initially, each party computes
a secret and generates a verifier with a one-way hash function. They swap their secrets and
use them as long term swapped secrets. For each session, each party generates another session
secret and swaps with the other party. The session key is generated from the swapped long
term and session secrets. Authentication is completed when both parties confirm that they
have the same session key.
AKE is similar to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange approach. Session keys are formed
based on the swapped secrets. The difference is that AKE combines some shared secrets in
forming the session key. The shared secrets make AKE free from Man-in-the-Middle Attacks.
No encryption is used in AKE and it takes only four steps. It is not suitable for mobile users,
as both parties must store the verifier of the other party.
53.3 Integrated Key Exchange Protocol
Existing key exchange schemes do not offer transmission of new passwords. The DP of a one-
time Dynamic Password will be renewed with every login. Integrated Key Exchange Using
Dynamic Passwords is a password authentication protocol which authenticates users, delivers
new DP to users and establishes session keys.
Integrate Key Exchange Using Dynamic Password (IKE) consists of two phases. In the
Registration phase, users get their account names, SP and initial DP . The login phase is a
typical user login session. We will assume each user can only have a single login session. The
server will reject multiple login sessions for one user. In the discussion that follows, a server
running IKE is called IKES . An application on the user side running IKE is called IKEC .
The user uses IKEC to login to IKES . The abbreviations used are listed in Table 2.
Table 2. List of abbreviations for IKE.
Abbr. Meaning
DP Dynamic Part of a Dynamic Password
DPn New DP selected by Server
SP Static Part of a Dynamic Password
H(X) One way hash value of X
Rn The n
th random number
Mn The n
th message
SK Session Key
{X}Y Symmetric encryption of X using key Y
{X}Y Symmetric decryption of X using key Y
RandomGen() Random string generator
SPPasswdMap(X) Maps X from random string space to SP password space with character set [[4-6]letter word]
DPPasswdMap(X) Maps X from random string space to DP password space with character set [A-Za-z0-9]
Phase 1: Registration
The registration process is performed at IKES . The user first selects a unique account name.
IKES then generates two random numbers and maps them to SP and DP password spaces
to form SP and DP respectively. The SP and DP are then transferred to the user via a
secure channel. IKES uses some one-way function to form hash values of SP and DP . The
H(SP ) and H(DP ) are stored in IKES . SP and DP are erased from IKES . The process of
registration is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Registration Phase of Integrated Key Exchange Using Dynamic Passwords
Begin (Server Side)
AccountName←− UserInput
SP ←− SPPasswdMap(RandomGen())
DP ←− DPPasswdMap(RandomGen())
SecureF ileStorage←− H(SP ), H(DP )
User ←− DP,SP
end
6After registration, the server will haveH(SP ) andH(DP ). The user will have to remember
SP and DP . DP will be changed with every successful login.
Phase 2: Authentication
An honest execution of the protocol is shown in Algorithm 2.2
Algorithm 2: An honest execution of Integrated Key Exchange Using Dynamic Passwords
Begin (Process 1, Client Side)
DP,SP ←− UserInput
R1 ←− RandomGen()
M1 ←− {R1}H(SP )
end
M1(fromClient) −→ Server
Begin (Process 2, Server Side)
H(DP ), H(SP )←− SecureF ileStorage
R1 ←− {M1}H(SP )
R2 ←− RandomGen()
DPn ←− DPPasswdMap(RandomGen())
M2 ←− {R1, DPn}R1
end
Client←−M2(fromServer)
Begin (Process 3, Client Side)
R1, DPn ←− {M2}R1
R3 ←− RandomGen()
M3 ←− {R3, H(DP )}R2
SK ←− H(R1, R2, R3)
DP ←− DPn Upon successful use of SK
end
M3(fromClient) −→ Server
Begin (Process 4, Server Side)
R2 ←− StoredMemory
H(DP )←− {M3}R2
Compare H(DP ) with stored value
SK ←− H(R1, R2, R3)
H(DP )←− H(DPn) Upon successful use of
SK
end
2 Algorithm 2 has been refined to address the vulnerability of dictionary attacks against the combined password
which concerned the reviewer.
7Process 1: To start a login session, the user inputs the account name, SP and DP to
IKEC . IKEC generates a random string R1 and forms message M1:
M1 = {R1}H(SP ) (1)
IKEC deletes SP , DP and H(SP ) because they are not needed by IKEC any more. However
IKEC holds R1 and H(DP ) until the session key is established.M1 and account name are sent
to IKES .
Process 2:When IKES receives M1 and the account name from IKEC , IKES retrieves the
corresponding H(SP ). IKES decrypts M1 and gets R1. IKES generates a new DPn, a random
string R2 and forms message M2 which is sent to IKEC .
M2 = {R2, DPn}R1 (2)
Process 3: Upon receiving M2, IKEC decrypts M2 using the stored value of R1 and
extracts the random string R2. IKEC generates a random string R3 and forms message M3.
M3 is sent to IKES .
M3 = {R3, DP}R2 (3)
SK = H(R1, R2, R3) (4)
Upon successful use of SK, IKEC will display DPn to the user. The user must use this new
DPn in place of the old DP If IKEC does not receive a valid M2 after a predefined period of
time, IKECmay assume that IKES has not received the login message M1. So IKEC will delete
all stored information about the user and prompt the user for a new login.
Process 4: After receivingM3, IKES decryptsM3 and extracts DP and R3. DP is hashed
and compared with the corresponding stored hash values. If they match, IKES will form SK
as in equation (4).
Upon successful use of SK, IKES will replace the storedH(DP ) withH(DPn). If IKES does
not receive a valid M3 after a predefined period of time, IKESmay assume that IKEC has not
received the messageM2. So IKEC will delete all stored information about the user and prompt
the user for a new login. IKEC cannot communicate with IKES using SK and so will not display
DPn to the user as the new DP .
4 Analysis of Integrated Key Exchange
Mutual Authentication IKE provides explicit user authentication and implicit server
authentication. If the user does not provide the proper DP in M3, user authentication fails.
If the user cannot communicate with the server using SK, it means that one or more of the
random strings R1, R2 and R3 do not have the same corresponding values in the server. It
implies that the server has not use the proper H(SP ) to decryptM1. So server authentication
fails.
Dictionary Attacks If the messages exchanged in the authentication process contain
publicly known information that can be used to validate a password guess, dictionary attacks
are possible. In IKE, the contents of messages M1, M2 and M3 are listed in equations (1, 2,
3).
8As the character set ofDP andDPn is [A-Za-z0-9], R1, R2 and R3 are randomly generated,
so the content of M1, M2 and M3 do not provide any extra information for the adversary to
validate their password guesses.
Replay Attacks After each successful login, IKES will store a new H(DPn) in its secret
files. The user will be prompted to remember the new DPn displayed on the screen for next
login. If an adversary replays any previous login messages, the DP used in M3 cannot form
the same hash value as the H(DP ) stored in IKES . User authentication will fail. This will
prevent adversaries from launching replay attacks.
Brute Force Attack In IKE, the Dynamic Password used must satisfy the length and
lifetime for resisting on-line brute force attacks. Increasing the length of SP and DP will
increase the strength of Dynamic Passwords formed. This will reduce the chance of success
for on-line brute force attacks.
Table 1 shows that changing the DP from 1 character to 2 characters will change the
lifetime requirements of the Dynamic Password from 1 day to 1 year. In fact increasing the
length of the DP to 3 will give a lifetime of more than 80 years under the same conditions.
Spoofing The easiest way to compromise passwords is by looking over the shoulder of
users when they enter their passwords. IKE cannot stop adversaries from spying on user
passwords. But IKE makes such an attack harder with DP in the Dynamic Password. An
adversary has to look over the user’s shoulder while the user enters the SP and also when
the new DP is displayed by IKEC . The spying action is thus made more conspicuous and
suspicious. The chance that an adversary can get both the SP and the new DP without
alerting the user is much less than with simple password entry.
Revealing Spoofing If an adversary has knowledge of a valid account name and pass-
word, he can login to the account and just read information without changing anything. It is
hard for a user to discover that an adversary has gained access to his account.
As the DP of the user changes for every successful login, the DP will be changed by the
spoofed login. The legitimate user still assumes and uses the expired DP to initiate a login
session after spoofing. Obviously the user cannot login. At this point, the user must contact
the server administrator and re-initialize his SP and DP . He can then check with the server
administrator as to the time of his last successful login. The last login time may reveal whether
spoofing has occurred or not.
5 Application of IKE
IKE is highly portable compared to authentication schemes that use passwords. To apply
IKE, all we have to do is to determine the lengths of the SP and the DP , the one-way hash
algorithm and the symmetric encryption algorithm to be used in IKE4.
One common one-way hash algorithm is the MD5 algorithm which produces 128 bit hash
values. SHA1 produces 160 bit hash values. Triple DES may be used as the symmetric en-
cryption algorithm. SP can be 4 random words from a set of 4-6 letter dictionary words. DP
can be 4 or more random characters from the character set [A-Za-z0-9].
Kerberos is a network authentication system that uses passwords. After authentication, a
user has to get tickets for different services. In Section 5.2 we will describe how IKE can be
used in Kerberos to perform user password authentication.
95.1 Distributed Computer Networks Systems
We can apply IKE in its simplest form without any adaptation. In a typical client-server
situation, IKE can provide the necessary mutual authentication between client and server.
In a distributed computer networks system, a user can login to an authentication server
and obtain session keys or service tokens to be used with other servers within the system. Using
IKE, the traffic between the authentication server and the user are protected by symmetric
encryptions that have different keys for every message. The random nature of the authenti-
cation message content makes the authentication process immune to dictionary attacks. The
ability of IKE to reveal spoofing makes the user more confident about personal privacy and
system security within the distributed computer networks system.
5.2 IKE ported to Kerberos
We can also port IKE to other authentication schemes using passwords. Kerberos is an
authentication protocol for accessing distributed resources across the network. Kerberos au-
thenticates and grants tickets to users. Tickets enable users to use different services within a
certain period of time without any further need to authenticate themselves. The only major
drawback is that it is vulnerable to dictionary attack. IKE is practically immune from dic-
tionary attack and complements the password authentication part of Kerberos. Porting IKE
to Kerberos involves some minimal changes to the message exchange steps in Kerberos.
The abbreviations used in the Kerberos message exchange are listed in Table 3. During
Table 3. List of abbreviations used in Kerberos message exchange.
Abbr. Meaning
C Account User Name
T Ticket Granting Server name
KDC Key Distribution Center
KX Secret key of entity X
KXY Session key between entities X and Y
{M}K Message M encrypted with key K
Kerberos message exchange, an adversary can easily pretend to be a legitimate user and
sends KDC an initial plain request. KDC just returns message 2 to the adversary without
any authentication. The session key between the TGS and the client is encrypted with the
secret key of the client, which is derived from the user password using some known function.
The adversary can then start dictionary attacks or brute-force attacks on the encrypted session
key and validate his guesses against some known format data encrypted along with the session
key.
IKE can be applied to Kerberos. The share secret changes from a secret symmetric key
to hashes HSP and HHDP . MessageM1 and messageM2 need to be changed with an added
step between message M2 and message M3. The rest remains the same.
M1 = C, T Plain request from client to server changes to (5)
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M1 = {R3,H(DP )}H(SP ) (6)
M2 = {KCT }KC The KDC encrypted reply message changes to (7)
M2 = {KCT , DPn}R1 (8)
An added message M2a is sent from the user to KDC:
M2a = {R3,H(DP )}H(SP ) (9)
6 Conclusion
Integrated Key Exchange Using Dynamic Password is a password authentication scheme,
which allows us to have the benefit of strong passwords with short lifetime, yet with easy
to remember passwords. The authentication messages are immune to replay and dictionary
attacks. IKE is also portable and reveals spoofing. IKE is also resistant to social engineering.
The strength of the protocol relies on the strength of the encryption algorithm and the hashing
algorithm used. Implementation of IKE is simple, easy and cheap. It can easily be adapted
for use in Kerberos and is most suitable for Distributed Networks Systems. To improve and
provide a formal security argument for IKE will be the focus of our future work.
7 Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Peter Cattell for proof reading this paper.
References
1. Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt: Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols Secure
Against Dictionary Attacks. Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland,
California. (May 1992) 72-84
2. Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt: Augmented Encrypted Key Exchange: A Password-Based Protocol
Secure against Dictionary Attacks and Password File Compromise. ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. (1993) 244-250
3. N. Haller and C. Metz and P. Nezzerr and M. Straw: A One-Time Password System. RFC2889 (Feb 1998)
4. David P. Jablon: Strong Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange. Computer Communication Review.
26(5) (1996) 5–26
5. David P. Jablon: Extended Password Key Exchange Protocols Immune to Dictionary Attack. Proceedings
of the WETICE’97 Workshop on Enterprise Security, Cambridge, MA, USA. (1997)
6. Stefan Lucks: Open Key Exchange: How to Defeat Dictionary Attacks without Encrypting Public Keys.
Ecole Normale Suprieure, Paris. (April 1997) 79–90
7. National Institute of Standards and Technology: Password Usage. Federal Information Processing Stan-
dards Publication. 112 (May 1985)
8. Michael Steiner and Gene Tsudik and Michael Waidner: Refinement and Extension of Encrypted Key
Exchange. Operating Systems Review. 29(3) 22-30
9. Thomas Wu: The Secure Remote Password Protocol. Proceedings of the 1998 Internet Society Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium, San Diego, CA. (1998) 97–111
